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ABSTRACT 
Companies across all sectors with increasingly smaller size rely on alliance relationships to bolster revenues during 
times of economic uncertainty. When forming alliances, large firms typically hire vendors such as investment banks to 
help identify potential alliance partners. However, small businesses with intention to build alliance find difficulties to 
search desired partners especially on a global arena due to three causes: 1) lack of skills, resources and information; 2) 
too small to capture the attention of investment banks or alike; 3) not affordable to the high search fee charged by 
vendors. Thus, reliable information about small business market is often limited. The odds of successful search and 
match become very low given their limited access to right information. In fact, traditionally labor-intensive search and 
match either by investment banks or by firms themselves have been both costly and time-consuming. On the demand 
side, small businesses are searching for more alliance opportunities than ever before while deal size has been 
increasingly declining since the last two decades. The globalizing, deregulation and internet are attributed to the driving 
forces of this trend. Under this circumstances, E-Alliances is able to close the huge gap between the demand side which 
represents the tremendous alliance search needs of small businesses worldwide and the supply side which is constrained 
by search capacity. In this paper, the author will interpret how E-Alliances is able to help worldwide small business 
companies to reach their desired partners in a fast, cheap and DIY manner. The author will also discuss the outlook of 
alliance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies across all sectors with increasingly smaller 
size rely on alliance relationships to bolster revenues 
during times of economic uncertainty. Indeed, the 
percent of total business involving alliances continues to 
grow rapidly over time. Alliances enable companies to 
pursue new growth opportunities without incurring the 
costs and risks associated with other development 
options.  
 
 
Source: McKinsey 2001 
Figure 1. Growth of alliance activities 
 
When forming alliances, large firms typically hire 
vendors such as investment banks to help identify 
potential alliance partners. However, small businesses 
with intention to build alliance find difficulties to search 
desired partners especially on a global arena due to 
three causes: 1) lack of skills, resources and information; 
2) too small to capture the attention of investment banks 
or alike; 3) not affordable to the high search fee charged 
by vendors. Thus, reliable information about small 
business market is often limited. As a result, many 
companies in the small market have developed their 
own methods to identify and obtain information 
concerning potential alliance targets, rarely engaging 
investment banks during the identification phase, but 
occasionally employing them as the deal progresses. 
The odds of successful search and match become very 
low given their limited access to right information. In 
fact, traditionally labor-intensive search and match 
either by investment banks or by firms themselves have 
been both costly and time-consuming. To a large extent, 
this explains why investment banks are lured by large 
deals while rejecting small ones. On the demand side, 
small businesses are searching for more alliance 
opportunities than ever before while deal size has been 
increasingly declining since the last two decades. The 
globalizing, deregulation and internet are attributed to 
the driving forces of this trend. Under this 
circumstances, E-Alliances is able to close the huge gap 
between the demand side which represents the 
tremendous alliance search needs of small businesses 
worldwide and the supply side which is constrained by 
search capacity. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
how E-Alliances is able to help worldwide small 
business companies to reach their desired partners in a 
fast, cheap and DIY manner. The author will also 
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discuss the outlook of alliance. The results suggest that 
the entry of e-Alliances should stimulate alliance 
activity and enhance the efficiency of market. 
 
In an alliance market, there exist huge numbers of firms 
which look for alliance opportunities. E-Alliances 
provides an online marketplace for firms to search and 
match each others. Each firm will first register in by 
offering its company information and desired partner 
criteria through a series of simple click of either single 
or multiple choices. To obtain an even higher quality 
partner list, searching firms can even enter more 
selection criteria by category method such as alliance 
type, locations, industry and/or by weighted preference 
of criteria called Deal Fit Index (DFI). The criteria 
designated basically enables specific firm to sort 
potential partners according to its alliance objectives 
and appropriate alliance structures which varies from 
equity-based alliances such as merger & acquisition, 
joint venture, etc. to non-equity-based ones such as 
joint-R&D, license agreement, OEM, etc. With all 
individual firm’s information inside, E-Alliances 
automatically matches the firms and provides a shortlist 
of potential partners for each member firm. For 
advanced members, they are able to view a highly 
selective shortlist based on DFI, which are sorted from a 
huge member database throughout the world. The 
search and match of E-Alliances are 7×24 real-time 
based which automatically send email to logged-out 
members to inform them of new prospects which show 
interest in them. E-Alliances also provides mailbox for 
members to connect each other for further relationship 
building. The author concludes that E-Alliances 
significantly improves firms’ ability to search quality 
partners from both scale and scope in a real time, global 
reach, and cost effective way. To facilitate the deal 
progress and provide the members with total solution, 
E- Alliances will strive to create the value chain by 
providing customer education programs to develop 
members’ alliance skills and inviting qualified vendors 
to provide professional services like due diligence, 
valuation, negotiation, accounting and law, post-alliance 
integration, etc. 
 
2. PERFORMANCE OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
 
Research has reported that building alliance will 
improve performance of both allying firms and market 
with an example of OEM partnership [1]. (Ren 2003)  
Consider a simple economy with only two firms: firm A 
and firm B. The both firms make same product. Firm A 
is legally allowed to sell its product in region B; in 
symmetry, firm B is legally allowed to sell its product in 
region A. Firm A and firm B can only make decision on 
the quantity of their own production, i.e., Cartel is 
prohibited.  
 
The product price is the function of production in both 
region A and B, denoted by the following equation (1): 
P(z) = za −              (1) 
The marginal cost is denoted by c and suppose there is 
no fixed cost of production. However, a firm must incur 
a fixed a fixed cost of distribution channel management 
in order to sell in a region, denoted by D. 
 
Furthermore, in order to sell in an outside region, a firm 
has to not only incur the distribution cost but also bear 
the shipment cost. This suggests that the total cost of 
making and shipping one unit product is c/g with 
1<g<≤1 (shipment cost is zero if g=1). Q is the rental 
cost of one firm pays to another for the use of its 
infrastructure and distribution channel.  
 
In direct competition, the two firms pursue each own 
profit maximization as equation (2) and (3): 
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On the other hand, when two firms ally in OEM model, 
they agree on the equilibrium point for a rental value q. 
Because the two markets are symmetric, we only 
consider the region A. In market region A, the profit 
maximization conditions of two firms are as shown 
below: 
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To evaluate market performance, Ren (2003) examined 
the respective impact of the above two models on total 
surplus of welfare. In the Nash equilibrium of direct 
competition in market region A, the total surplus of 
welfare is as below: 
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In the Nash equilibrium of OEM alliance model in 
market region A, the total surplus of welfare is as 
below: 
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Obviously, W1 and W2 are the functions of the fixed 
cost D to set up distribution channels. To compare the 
performance of the above two situations, we find the 
partial derivative of the difference between W1 and W2 
against variable D. as shown below: 
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Ren (2003) further discussed how W1 – W2 differs in 
two cases when D=Dmax and D=0, respectively. He drew 
the conclusion that OEM alliance helps increase the 
total welfare and thus improve the market efficiency. 
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Studies of alliance performance are discussed in many 
other business literatures. Jay [2] (2002) suggested that 
alliance relationship building can be considered as real 
option so that its performance could be valuated through 
adjusted Black-Scholes equation. However, he did not 
illustrate how to do that but instead, went back to a 
more intuitive NPV rule to valuate the synergy of 
allying firm A and firm B as below: 
)()()( BNPVANPVBANPV +>+     (9) 
 
3. ALLIANCE SEARCH AND MATCH THROUGH 
INTERMEDIARIES 
 
3.1 Cost of direct search and intermediary search 
 
Consider a market with many heterogeneous firms who 
search and match for alliance. We review a simple 
economy with two firms: Firm A and Firm B, to seek 
each other for partnership. Before alliance, the two 
firms maximize their profit VA and VB, respectively. 
They directly reach each other to bargain and finally 
decide to ally. After allying, they achieve a profit V. 
However, a search cost is C.  We suppose the alliance 
brings in a positive gain for both parties as below: 
)()( BVAVCV +>−      (10) 
For simplicity, we suppose the both parties equally 
share the gain: 
2
CV −      (11) 
Given the uncertainty for search directly, suppose a 
intermediary can help both firms to find each other. The 
intermediary incur the search cost T. Apparently, when 
and only when the intermediary can reduce the search 
cost, the indirect transaction through intermediary can 
really happens, that is 
CT ≤      (12) 
The deal volume processed by intermediary is far 
exceeding that of an individual firm. Moreover, an 
intermediary stay much longer in the market than any 
single firm and thus build up a credibility which lasts 
much longer than that of an individual firm. The deal 
volume and brand longevity of intermediary create cost 
advantage over the direct search. 
 
3.2 Cost of human search and internet search 
 
The search by intermediary can be human-based 
historically (e.g., investment banks, accounting firms, 
etc) and web-based which is innovative E-Alliances. 
Because of the uncertainty of search business, both 
human search and internet search will incur search cost. 
For instance, search results via internet can immediately 
appear on the screen while human search must wait for 
longer time. After wait, the alliance gain which is V – T 
is achieved and equally shared between the allying two 
firms. If the two firms discount the future alliance gain 
with ratio δ, then the present value of the human search 
equals to  
2
)( TV −δ
    (13) 
This implies that the human search cost is  
))(1( TVH −−= δ    (14) 
When and only when  
))(1( TVHI −−=≤ δ   (15) 
The internet search is better off than the human search. 
Since the human reach is limited by time and space, the 
human search can find the right match at a probabilityβ. 
Suppose the website of internet search is widely known, 
thus the human search cost will be 
))(1( TVH −−= β    (16) 
If the matching process by human search is inefficient, 
then β is very small; consequently, internet search will 
be superior to the human search. In reality, while big 
firms have a broad network, professional expertise and 
good money to guarantee efficient search (increase β), 
small business is inferior to this situation with limited 
access, few talents and less money to lure attention of 
search vendors (β is fairly low). Accordingly, a new 
approach to search and match for small business 
partnership is essential. E-Alliances becomes appealing 
to alliance search for small business due to its 
self-service, global reach and low cost. 
 
4. WORKING MODEL OF E-ALLIANCES 
 
E-Alliances provides an internet search marketplace for 
firms to search and match ideal partners. In particular, 
small business firms are targeted customers for this 
marketplace with driving factors in three folds: 1) 
neglect by  human search institution because the deal 
is too small to capture the attention of investment banks 
or alike; 2)inaffordability to high human search cost; 
3)liquidity generated by positive feedback of internet 
which follows the Metcalf Law. The online alliance 
search engine is supposed to provide small business a 
perfect tool to search and match at low cost, high speed 
and global reach. 
 
4.1 Quick match through Aladdin setting 
 
To increase liquidity by attracting as many as possible 
firms to join in paid-membership, E-Alliances develops 
a quick match functionality to quickly show real-time 
match results by asking search firms to create their own 
Aladdin setting, which requests the firm to make single 
or multiple choices against a designated questions 
reflecting a series of search criteria of the firm. Once the 
firm finish and submit its result, it instantly shows on 
the screen a list of prospects which satisfy its Aladdin 
settings, as shown below 
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Figure 2. Illustrated list of quick match 
 
The sequence of prospect list is sorted in Basic Match 
status based on their match level of criteria preset in 
Aladdin setting. The search firm can further review a 
prospect’s profile by clicking its username as shown 
below 
 
 
Figure 3. Illustrated prospect profile 
 
If the firm is interested in the prospect, it can either send 
a email to the prospect or add the prospect into its hot 
list for later contact. 
 
4.2 Browse profiles through demographics 
 
To satisfy firms’ need to search by demographics, 
E-Alliances provides category search such as alliance 
type, geographic and industry. The prospect list then 
further sequenced according to matching level with the 
above demographics, as shown below 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under this search mode, search is more accurate and 
time is further saved for the member firms. 
 
 
 
4.3 Advanced search through Deal Fit Index® 
 
To identify potential partners, searching firms should 
formulate the criteria for evaluating potential partners, 
and determine which candidate best meets these criteria.  
The main goal of the firm is to determine if there are 
suitable partners that can help it fill its capability gap. 
Making this selection requires that the firm understand 
and rank each prospective partner's critical attributes in 
terms of how well they meet the firm's criteria. 
E-Alliances provides the paid members with a 
designated criteria with weighted preference through 
single or multiple choices by simple clicks. As result of 
this exercise, the firm can quickly present the 
conceptual structure of the alliance to the candidates for 
their matching criteria. At the end of this stage, the firm 
should have a shortlist of prospects with best fit on its 
objectives for entering into the alliance, which are 
ranked by their Deal Fit Index (DFI®). The firm may 
also wish to re-examine the list of required partner 
attributes to confirm that the criteria is realistic by going 
back to its original setting to make adjustment of weight 
and preference. 
 
5. CHALLENGES FOR E-ALLIANCES 
 
Besides the functionalities designated, three other 
factors appear intrinsic to any marketplace able to 
sustain itself over the long term: liquidity, credibility 
and value-added services. These elements determine 
whether a marketplace can enlist users and provide them 
sufficient value to continue their participation. A 
marketplace initiative must manage these key issues 
well.  
 
5.1 Liquidity 
 
Generating liquidity by attracting enough customers is 
the most significant challenge to a marketplace’s 
success. A new, electronic marketplace must compete 
against traditional methods of alliance service. While 
the e-business may offer administrative savings through 
automation, the presence of too few participants will 
leave marketplace prices out of alignment with regular 
channels.  
 
5.2 Credibility 
 
As a new, shared model for conducting business, 
marketplaces depend upon the trust of their participants. 
The marketplace host maintains access, at least 
theoretically, to all information that parties exchange. 
This insight into pricing and purchasing behavior can 
scare off participants fearful that the information may be 
turned against them in some way. While regulators will 
set rules limiting the worst abuses, consortia must take 
additional steps to demonstrate neutrality and build trust 
among marketplace users. Methods include setting up 
independent management executives and information 
firewalls between owners and participants. Pure plays 
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can attempt to claim the high ground as disinterested 
parties because the owners never buy or sell goods in 
the marketplace. However, as pure plays begin to accept 
equity investments from industry incumbents, the lines 
between ownership models begin to blur. Yet, in the end, 
liquidity cannot develop if users mistrust the 
marketplace and conduct transactions on other sites or 
through other channels. 
 
5.3 Value-added services 
 
To succeed in a long run, E-alliances must effectively 
integrate the value chain services into an alliance 
solution to the client. 
 
Regardless of the alliance structure, alliance process is 
inherently complex at variety of difficulties which are 
far beyond small firms’ capability because it heavily 
involve in people, process and tools. In other words, 
E-Alliances alone is not sufficient to satisfy firms’ 
alliance needs.  Alliance services typically comprise 
the following phases: 
Alliance needs assessment. This services encompasses 
strategy consulting, including needs assessment, 
assistance with a decision on whether alliance is a 
feasible and beneficial option, evaluation of various 
options (m&a, joint venture, divestiture, OEM, channel 
sales agreement, joint R&D, etc.), and assistance in 
choosing the right option. The strategy work requires a 
deep knowledge of the client’s business and tight 
alignment of merger options with the overall short- and 
long-term business strategy of a company. 
Partner selection. The imperative task in this phase is 
assessing the strategic value of the partner. It is 
important not to treat it as a standalone activity. The 
valuation process must be closely integrated with the 
business strategy and integration plan to achieve the 
desired result. 
Due diligence. Due diligence is conducted by the lead 
alliance services provider, or it is outsourced to an 
independent party. 
Transactional services. Transactional services include 
negotiation and financial/legal advisory. A partner is 
chosen either by the alliance services provider together 
with the client. 
Customer education services. Customer education 
programs seek to deliver information that enables 
customers to more effectively utilize a company’s 
product. 
 
6. OUTLOOK OF E-ALLIANCES 
 
So far, I have interpreted how E-Alliances will help 
small business address their critical alliance issues from 
a market microstructure perspective. Since E-Alliances 
has intrinsically a global orientation, both from an 
alliance point view and internet standpoint, we are 
optimistic that it will become the world’s largest base of 
alliance. Its success will be not only measured by hit 
rate of customers, but also by the alliance deal success 
rate. Furthermore, E-Alliances provides an emerging 
market like China with a unique value to attract foreign 
direct investment, facilitate knowledge and technology 
transfer, and boost trade volume among countries. It will 
also help stimulate information transparency and 
establishment of national credit system. In essence, 
E-Alliances will contribute to accelerate the growth of 
worldwide small business by fostering successful 
alliances among them wherever they are.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Firms with complementary value are more likely to 
achieve synergetic performance through alliance than 
that of they work alone, even though the success is not 
guaranteed (according to David and Tammy[3] 2000, 
50% of the alliance failed). To seek a partner, a firm can 
search by itself or by use of intermediary. The decision 
depends on the cost incurred by each alternative. For 
intermediary search, internet search reshaping the 
alliance economics by competing with the traditional 
human search. Giving its self-service, low cost, speed, 
global reach and 7×24 working mode, internet is 
gaining competitive advantage over the human search. 
Small business firms can benefit from the internet 
search most for they have limited access, few talents 
and less money. As an online marketplace, E-Alliances 
provides the small business with variety of search 
approaches to meet their search needs for alliances. 
However, while E-Alliances offers creative, promising 
functionalities, it faces challenges of liquidity and 
credibility generation , too. In particular, E-Alliances’ 
success largely relies on the ability to restructure the 
alliance value chain by integrating E-Alliances and  
necessary value-added services into customer solution. 
To look ahead, E-Alliances will become the world’s 
largest base of alliance and contribute to both micro- 
and macro economy by facilitating firm collaboration 
around the world.  
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